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20 TEN THINGS WE DON’T 
KNOW ABOUT GICS
1. What are the solar and interplanetary events and signatures that are most ‘geoeffective’ 
in terms of GIC causation? 
2. What are the characteristics of extreme geomagnetic storms that pose the highest risk 
to power systems?
3. In predicting GICs, what is the contribution of each of the different components of the 
geomagnetic field and other parameters such as the ionospheric total electron content 
and the interplanetary magnetic field (e.g. Pulkkinen et al., Space Weather, 2006)?
4. What are the definitive spatial/temporal scales of the magnetospheric and ionospheric 
currents that drive significant GICs in grids?
5. What is an adequate number/distribution of magnetometers to model GICs?
6. Which information, given on what timescale, is most useful for any given power utility/authority to manage its GIC risk?
7. In modelling GICs in a power grid, what is an appropriate level of detail required of Earth conductivity (as a 3D model or otherwise)?
8. What are the characteristics of power transformers that determine their susceptibility to GICs and therefore determine the extent 
of damage sustained under different levels of GICs?
9. What are the transformer failure mechanisms subsequent to damage initiated by GICs?
10. Where should scientists go to access industry archives, particularly archives of any GIC measurements obtained 
concurrently with network data (i.e. network configuration and connections, DC resistances of transmission lines
and transformers and station earthing resistances)?
9. What are the transformer failure mechanisms subse-
quent to damage initiated by GICs?
This is related to point 8. Major details are understood
from observations of GIC damage, but laboratory tests
on failure modes are rare. How do gassing and other
condition monitoring records help? Are there emerging
industry standards for transformers, for protection
against GICs and the subsequent deterioration leading
to failure? What other work needs to be done here?
10. Where should scientists go to gain access to industry
archives, particularly archives of any GIC measurements
obtained concurrently with network data (i.e. network con-
figuration and connections, DC resistances of transmission
lines and transformers and station earthing resistances)?
The absence of open source data is a continuing prob-
lem for scientists, although the commercial issues are
appreciated. However, some progress, perhaps through
support from national industry regulators, industry or
professional societies would be helpful. Also, there is a
need for long term monitoring in any given power grid,
as the electrical (near-DC) characteristics of each grid
changes over time.
5. Conclusions
Compared with the ‘do knows’ in our list, our ‘don’t
knows’ may be more contentious within the scientific com-
munity. It may be debated which items are most important
at the present time, understanding that other issues might
yet become more relevant. However, by making scientific
progress on our current ‘don’t knows’ we do believe that
scientists will improve their ability to monitor, model and
predict the impacts of space weather and GICs on power
grids.
Solar cycle 24 is just beginning and we can expect that
the space weather hazard to ground-based technologies will
increase, just as it did during the up-turn of previous cycles.
The main message of the Hermanus workshop is therefore
that we need a wider discussion on all of the issues, not just
within the GIC science community, but also within indus-
try and wider society. We hope that our lists will go some
way to start that discussion and promote much needed
future research.
A future scientific workshop is planned for 2010/2011,
again in South Africa. This meeting is planned to be more
broadly based than the recent one was, involving invita-
tions to specialists from outside the UK and South Africa.
At this meeting we will discuss what progress has been
made against our list of ‘don’t knows’ and, in general, dis-
cuss progress on GIC risk assessment and on the geomag-
netic hazard. We would also like to be able to consider the
wider impacts of GIC, for example, within pipeline and
railway networks.
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Fig. 6. Large storms identified by the peak in the 24-h running average (aa*) of the 3-h geomagnetic aa index against time, since 1868, overlain with
monthly smoothed solar sunspot number. A threshold of 80 nT has been used to better identify the largest individual storms. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
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ABSTRACT
Solar activity gives rise to changes in the near- Earth space environment, often referred to as space 
weather, that can adversely affect technologies on and above the surface of the Earth. For example, the 
impact of a coronal mass ejection on the Earth’s protective magnetosphere can lead to a geomagnetic 
storm, boosting existing magnetospheric currents. These current systems cause large magnetic variations 
that induce electric fields in the solid Earth. These fields, in turn, generate geomagnetically induced currents 
(GICs) that flow in conducting pipes and wires, in ways influenced by the electrical properties of each 
network. Consequently, power grids and pipeline networks at all latitudes are at risk from the natural 
hazard of GICs. As solar activity begins to increase from the deepest solar minimum in a century, we 
consider the current understanding of this hazard, as it affects major power systems in Europe and Africa. 
We also summarise what can be said with some certainty about the hazard and what research is yet 
required to address outstanding questions and develop useful tools for geomagnetic hazard mitigation.
1. Solar storms (i.e. CMEs) that lead to high levels of GICs are statistically 
more likely during periods close to solar maximum and in the descending 
phase of the solar cycle, but they do also occur at all other times in the 
solar activity cycle.
2. The magnetospheric and ionospheric currents that drive GICs are different 
at different latitudes.
3. The dominant cause of GICs in power grids is the time rate of change of 
the Earth’s magnetic field.
4. Interpolating the magnetic field from spatially distributed geomagnetic 
observations improves the prediction accuracy of GICs at any given point, 
even at mid-latitudes (e.g. Bernhardi et al., S. Afr. J. Sci., 2008). This is in 
comparison with pre- dictions made from data from a single magnetic 
observatory, taken to be representative of the ‘regional’ situation.
5. GICs are larger in countries and regions where the geology is generally 
more resistive (discussed, e.g., in Pirjola and Viljanen, URSI Symposium on 
Environmental and Space Electro-Magnetics,1991).
6. A multi-layered and laterally varying ground conductivity model gives 
better prediction of GICs, than the simpler assumption of an 
homogeneous Earth (e.g. Ngwira et al., Space Weather, 2008; Thomson et 
al., Space Weather, 2005). 
7. GICs have been demonstrated to affect power systems at all latitudes.
8. GICs can affect many power transformers simultaneously at multiple points 
across regional and continental scale networks.
9. Series capacitors in transmission lines may interrupt GIC flow in power 
networks, but are expensive. However, some strategies involving capacitors 
may increase GIC and reactive power demands (e.g. Erinmez et al., J. 
Atmos. Sol.-Terr. Phys.2002).
10. It is possible from transformer dissolved gas analysis to identify GIC-
initiated damage before complete trans- former failure occurs. This is 
especially true if the rate of gassing simultaneously increases in widely 
separated transformers across a network.
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Failure in a large South African generator 
transformer three weeks after the Halloween 
storm of October 2003. The disruption of the 
winding and insulation by the arcing fault at the 
time of final failure is clear. The arcing fault also 
destroys evidence that might lead to a better 
understanding of the progression of damage after 
initiation by the geomagnetic current event.
Results of dissolved gas analysis for a transformer
in South Africa during the geomagnetically active
period in late 2003.  Intervals of KP 6 and 7
level activity are also indicate.d  This
shows continued gas generation
throughout the period.  The 
ratios of different gases 
indicates low temp-
erature degradation
of paper insulation.
Similar trends
were observed
at other sites.
z
Large storms identified by 
peaks in the 24h running 
average (aa*) of the 3h geo-
magnetic aa index against 
time since 1868. Monthly
smoothed sunspot number is
also shown. An 80nT threshold
has been used to better identify
the largest individual storms. 
(e.g. Bernhardi et al., 2008). This is in comparison with pre-
dictions made from data from a single magnetic observa-
tory, taken to be representative of the ‘regional’ situation.
This follows from point 2. The natural magnetic field at
any point in a power grid, where we need to predict
GICs, is mostly affected by those magnetospheric and
ionospheric currents systems that are closest to it. Neigh-
bouring permanent geomagnetic observatories are the
best means to interpolate geomagnetic activity to a given
measurement site. Simplified assumptions – such as the
so-called ‘pl ne-wave model’, which is based on single-
site data – give an incomplete picture of magnetic
changes across regional scale power grids. In addition,
measured GIC at any point may be the sum of induction
processes in several connected transmission lines.
5. GICs are larger in countries and regions where the
geology is generally more resistive (discussed, e.g., in Pirj-
ola and Viljanen, 1991).
While the magnitude of the magnetic field change is the
most significant variable affecting the magnitude of the
GICs, higher resistance rock increases the natural sur-
face electric field t at acts as the voltage source (or ‘bat-
tery’) for GICs, operating in the line between the
Fig. 3. The complexity of ionospheric current vectors are shown, derived from UK and Scandinavian magnetometer data near the time of the storm
commencement during the July 15th 2000 magnetic storm. The scale vector at top left is 8 nT/s. Coloured spots denote measured GIC at six points in
national power grids at the time (red denotes a GIC flowing to the Earth) and in one gas pipeline in Finland. Spot size is proportional to measured current:
the largest current in this image was around 11 A at the time. Data are courtesy of Finnish Meteorological Institute (IMAGE), Lancaster University
(SAMNET), British Geological Survey, Scottish Power plc and Gasum Oy.
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The complexity of ionospheric current vectors derived 
from UK and Scandinavian magnetometer data near the 
time of the storm commencement during the 15 July
2000 magnetic storm. The scale vector at top left is
8 nT/s. Coloured spots denote measured GIC at 
in national p wer grids at the time (red shows
GIC flowing to the Earth) and in one gas
pipeline in Finland. Spot size is propor-
tional to measured GIC. The largest 
current at this time was ~11 A. Data
are courtesy of the Finnish Met. 
Institute, Lancaster University, 
the British Geological Survey, 
Scottish Power PLC and 
Gasum Oy.
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CONCLUSIONS
Compared with the ‘do knows’ in our list, our ‘don’t knows’ may be 
more contentious within the scientific community. It may be debated 
which items are most important at the present time, understanding that
other issues might yet become more relevant. However, by making progress 
on our current ‘don’t knows’ we expect advances in the community’s ability to 
monitor, model and predict the impacts of space weather and GICs on power grids.
Solar cycle 24 is just beginning and we can expect that the space weather hazard to
ground-based technologies will increase, just as it did during the up-turn of previous cycles.
 Wider discussion of these issues is required, not just within the international space weather
community, but also within industry and wider society.  
